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ISO 26262, HARA and ASIL

How the automotive functional safety standard turns hazards into ASIL ratings and safety requirements — the backbone of every safety-relevant ECU.

Why it exists

Electronics now steer, brake and accelerate vehicles. Random hardware faults and systematic software errors can cause accidents. ISO 26262 defines how to develop E/E systems so that this risk is acceptably low.

What the key ideas are

  • HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment): for each hazardous event, rate severity, exposure and controllability.
  • ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level): QM, A, B, C, D — derived from those ratings; D is the most demanding.
  • Safety goals → functional safety concept → technical safety concept → hardware and software requirements.
  • Safety case: the argument plus evidence that the system is safe enough.
From hazardous event to safety goal
Hazardous eventHazard in a specific operational situation
S / E / CSeverity, exposure and controllability
Risk classificationQM or ASIL A, B, C, D
Safety goalAssigned the hazardous event's ASIL

HARA combines severity, exposure and controllability; QM indicates that no ASIL is assigned.

How it shapes engineering

Higher ASILs require stricter methods (reviews, testing depth, tool qualification), hardware with high diagnostic coverage (e.g. lockstep cores, ECC) and architectural measures like redundancy. ASIL decomposition splits a requirement over independent redundant elements.

Best practices

  • Do the HARA early with representative driving situations; involve experts from vehicle dynamics and operations.
  • Keep safety requirements traceable from goals down to tests.
  • Maintain the safety case across software updates — not just at start of production.

Common pitfalls

  • Treating ISO 26262 as documentation work after development.
  • ASIL decomposition without real independence (shared power, shared software).

What it means for your discipline

  • Functional safety Core

    Owns the safety lifecycle, HARA, safety goals, safety concept and safety case.

  • E/E architecture Core

    The safety concept allocates requirements to elements — often driving redundancy and partitioning decisions.

  • Hardware & silicon Core

    Hardware metrics (single-point and latent fault metrics) and diagnostic coverage depend on the ASIL.

  • Base software Partial

    Software development methods, tools and safety mechanisms scale with the ASIL.

  • Cybersecurity Partial

    Security attacks can cause safety hazards; HARA and TARA must be aligned.

  • Software update & OTA Partial

    Coordinates safety impact assessments and required validation evidence before releasing updates to safety-relevant functions. Ensures installation, activation and recovery conditions respect the safety concept and that changes feed into the maintained safety case.

No direct stake: HPC & application software · Networks & communication · Diagnostics & lifecycle

Where it sits in the software stack

Generic layered software of a central HPC (application processor with hypervisor, plus a safety island) and of a classic MCU-based ECU (AUTOSAR Classic). Highlighted modules matter for this topic. Click any module to open its page.

HPC · application processor (MPU) and safety island (MCU)
  • ADAS functions — Safety-related ADAS software implements allocated safety requirements with development and verification evidence appropriate to their ASIL.
  • Safety monitors — Safety monitors detect hazardous deviations and initiate reactions defined by the technical safety concept.
  • WdgM · E2E · Dem — Watchdog supervision and E2E checks detect execution and communication faults required by the safety concept.
  • Lockstep cores — Lockstep execution and ECC support hardware fault detection and the diagnostic coverage required by allocated safety requirements.
MCU-based ECU · AUTOSAR Classic
  • Application layer — Application components implement safety requirements traced from safety goals through the technical safety concept.
  • OS — Memory and timing protection support independence where software with different safety requirements shares the MCU.
  • Memory · crypto · WdgM — Watchdog supervision and E2E checks provide execution and communication safety mechanisms allocated by the safety concept.
  • Microcontroller · HSM — Hardware safety mechanisms and their diagnostic coverage contribute to the required random hardware fault metrics.