Contents
StandardIETF

RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3)

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

RFC 8446 defines TLS 1.3, a protocol that authenticates communicating endpoints and protects the data exchanged between them.

What it is

RFC 8446 is the original IETF specification for TLS 1.3. TLS creates a protected channel between a client and a server, combining peer authentication, key establishment and authenticated encryption. Its handshake establishes security parameters; its record protocol protects subsequent application traffic. The specification is freely readable. TLS 1.3 specification

For vehicle engineers, possible endpoints include an ECU and a backend service, or two applications communicating over automotive Ethernet. Protection extends between the TLS endpoints: a gateway that terminates TLS can read the data before forwarding it through another connection.

Who it applies to

The document applies to implementations claiming TLS 1.3 support. It is a technical protocol specification, rather than an automotive regulation that independently mandates its use.

OEMs and suppliers select TLS through system requirements, interface agreements and security designs. Application developers, platform teams and backend operators then need compatible configurations and credentials. Integrating an existing library still requires decisions about trusted peers, identity verification and failure handling.

What it covers

The specification defines message formats and protocol behavior for establishing and maintaining a secure connection.

Mechanism Purpose
Handshake Negotiate parameters, authenticate peers and establish shared secrets
Record protection Encrypt application data and detect modification
Session resumption Reuse established security context through pre-shared keys
Key updates Refresh traffic keys during a connection

TLS supports certificate-based authentication and pre-shared keys. Client certificate authentication is optional; selecting TLS does not automatically establish mutual certificate authentication. Optional early data, commonly called 0-RTT, has replay risks and needs application-specific controls. RFC 8446

How it fits with other documents

RFC 9846 supersedes RFC 8446 while continuing to specify TLS 1.3. New requirements should identify the applicable specification and project profile explicitly; an existing reference to RFC 8446 warrants review. Replacement specification

TLS normally operates above a reliable transport such as TCP. MACsec protects Ethernet links, while IPsec protects traffic at the IP layer. Their protection boundaries differ, so selecting one requires understanding the communication path and trust boundaries.

Certificate validation relies on companion certificate specifications and an application identity policy. Automotive cybersecurity processes provide the wider risk-management context. TLS alone does not establish application authorization, update-package authenticity or functional safety.

In practice

Start with a connection inventory: identify each client, server, expected identity and point where encryption terminates. Then document permitted authentication methods, trust anchors, credential provisioning and renewal, and whether resumption or early data is allowed.

For an ECU downloading software, verify the backend identity and separately verify the update package before installation. A protected download connection does not establish that a package is authorized for that vehicle.

Test rejected credentials, incorrect peer identities, interrupted handshakes and recovery after connection loss. Measure handshake memory use and latency on the target ECU. Coordinate these tests across vehicle and backend teams so that certificate renewal, clock problems and service outages produce predictable behavior.

What it means for your discipline

  • CybersecurityCore

    Own the authentication policy, trust model and permitted TLS configuration. Review credential management, resumption and replay risks against the vehicle threat analysis.

  • HPC & application softwareCore

    Integrate the TLS library and implement peer identity checks, connection handling and secure error behavior. Ensure application authorization follows successful authentication.

  • E/E architecturePartial

    Choose where protected connections start and end, including gateways and backend proxies. Identify which components can access plaintext.

  • Base softwarePartial

    Provide the socket, cryptographic and credential services needed by the TLS implementation. Account for memory, entropy and startup dependencies.

  • Hardware & siliconPartial

    Support secure key storage, suitable random generation and any required cryptographic acceleration. Check whether hardware interfaces support the selected TLS library.

  • Networks & communicationPartial

    Account for handshake traffic, connection recovery and encrypted payloads when designing and troubleshooting Ethernet communication.

  • Diagnostics & lifecyclePartial

    When diagnostic connections use TLS, integrate credentials and peer verification into tester access. Keep diagnostic permissions separate from transport authentication.

  • Software update & OTAPartial

    Use authenticated channels for update downloads where specified. Retain independent package authenticity checks and recovery behavior.

No direct stake: Functional safety