What it is
The TPM 2.0 Library Specification defines a Trusted Platform Module: a component that provides protected cryptographic operations and maintains security-related state. Part 1, Architecture, explains the concepts and behavior behind those services, including objects, authorization, protected storage and platform measurements.
For an automotive engineer, it provides a vocabulary for asking where keys live, who may use them and what evidence supports trust in a computing platform. It does not prescribe a complete vehicle security architecture or establish automotive qualification. TCG describes these capabilities in its TPM technology overview.
Who it applies to
The specification primarily serves TPM implementers and engineers integrating TPM services into operating systems, boot software and applications. In a vehicle project, it becomes relevant when an ECU or central computer uses a TPM for credentials, protected secrets or attestation.
It is a technical specification rather than a regulation requiring every vehicle to contain a TPM. Applicable requirements depend on the selected platform, customer contract and security design. A project using another hardware security module still needs to establish whether that component implements TPM behavior; the labels are not interchangeable.
What it covers
Part 1 explains how TPM capabilities work together. Important concepts include:
| Concept | Practical meaning |
|---|---|
| Objects and hierarchies | Organize keys and data under defined protection and management relationships. |
| Authorization and policies | Control whether an operation is permitted, potentially using platform state as a condition. |
| Protected storage | Protect sensitive object material, including when wrapped objects are stored outside the TPM. |
| Platform Configuration Registers | Accumulate measurements supplied by platform software. |
| Attestation | Produce signed evidence that another party can evaluate. |
A measurement records information about software or configuration; it does not itself decide whether that software is acceptable. Likewise, measured boot and secure boot serve different purposes: recording what ran and enforcing what may run require coordinated platform mechanisms.
These concepts and their relationships are developed in Part 1: Architecture.
How it fits with other documents
Part 1 supplies the conceptual foundation. Other Library parts define structures and commands; platform specifications add integration requirements, while TPM Software Stack specifications describe software access. Use a consistent document set and its applicable errata. TCG identifies these relationships in its Library publication listing.
For automotive integration, distinguish TPM interfaces from SHE key-management services, vendor-specific HSM interfaces and AUTOSAR cryptographic APIs. Similar capabilities do not establish interface compatibility. The integration design must explain how the chosen services connect.
In practice
Consider a central computer whose credential may be used only in an approved boot state. The engineering team must define which software performs measurements, how authorization uses those measurements and how the credential is provisioned.
An update may legitimately change the measured state. Plan the policy transition and recovery path before deployment so an authorized update does not strand the credential. For attestation, also define which verifier evaluates evidence and how it obtains acceptable reference values.
During integration, test unauthorized use, interrupted provisioning, restart behavior, software updates and ECU replacement. Record ownership of credentials and recovery operations. Part 1 helps explain the expected behavior; implementation details and platform requirements determine the concrete tests.